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Abstract
We develop a model with two asymmetric countries. Firms choose the
number and the location of plants that they operate. The production
of each firm increases when trade costs fall. The fall also induces multi-
nationals to repatriate their production into a single country, which is
likely to be the large country because of the home market effect. The
net effect on total output is favorable in the large country and ambigu-
ous in the small country. We extend the model to endogenize country
sizes and we show that in an equilibrium with multinationals only, a
rent can be taxed by governments.
Keywords: globalization, economic geography, trade costs, multina-
tional firms, home market effect
JEL Classification: F12, F15, F23, R12, R30
0FUNDP-University of Namur, IZA-Bonn, and Core-Université catholique de Louvain.
I am grateful to Pierre M. Picard for very helpful comments. I also thank participants
at the 7th ETSG conference in Dublin, a workshop in Ghent, and the RIEF conference
in Rome.
This text presents research results of the Belgian Program on Interuniversity Poles of
Attraction initiated by the Belgian State, Prime Minister’s Office, Science Policy Pro-
gramming. The scientific responsibility is assumed by the authors.
1 Introduction
According to the home market effect, a large country hosts a more than
proportionate share of firms from an industry that produces differentiated
goods, and this effect is amplified at lower trade costs. (see Krugman,
1980; Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Head, Mayer and Ries, 2002; Ottaviano
and Thisse, 2004; Yu, 2005). To understand this result, consider single-
plant firms in two countries with prohibitive trade costs. Under reasonable
assumptions, profits are proportional to earnings, which, in autarchy, are
themselves proportional to the number of individuals living in each country.
At the location equilibrium, firms equalize their profits. Thus they locate
in proportion to the populations and there is no home market effect under
prohibitive trade costs. Now consider a fall in trade costs, making it possible
for consumers of a country to buy goods in the other country more easily.
As a consequence, firms now have to cope with home competitors as well
as with foreign competitors. The resulting change in competition is not the
same in each country. In the small country, firms now face the competition
of the large number of firms located in the large country, which strongly
affects their profits. By contrast profits of firms located in the large country
are less affected because the number of new competitors from the small
country is small. As a result, some firms have an incentive to relocate from
the small country to the large country: firms disproportionately locate in
the large country and this disproportion increases with trade openness.
The above reasoning considers countries of different sizes but abstracts
from multinationals. Let us now consider multinationals of the horizontal
type and abstract from differences in country sizes.1 It is well understood
that for prohibitive trade costs, firms duplicate their production in each
country and serve each market from their local plant. For lower trade costs,
the costs of exporting production from a single plant are lower than the cost
of duplication. Therefore, firms concentrate their production into a single
country (see e.g. Brainard, 1993, 1997; Markusen and Venables, 2000).
The current paper presents a model that combines these two strands
of the literature. It considers a model with two countries of unequal sizes
and with a sector producing a good under increasing returns to scale. It
examines how the firms’ organization (multinational versus single-plant),
the firms’ location, the firms’ production and the regional output respond
1Multinationals are of the “horizontal” type if they produce the same good in different
countries. They are of the “vertical” type if they separate production by stages, with their
headquarter in one country and their production in another country.
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to a change in trade costs and to a change in the population imbalance.2
We adopt a footloose capital model according to which one unit of capital
is required to run a firm, the total stock of capital is fixed worldwide and the
returns of that capital are distributed among capital owners who are spread
across both countries. Thus, there is fixed entry. This modeling creates a
rich set of equilibria, which we can derive analytically:3 (i) for large trade
costs, all firms are multinationals; (ii) for smaller trade costs, some firms
are multinationals and the others are single-plant firms in the large country;
(iii) for smaller trade costs, some firms are multinationals and the others
are single-plant firms in the large or in the small country; (iv) for smaller
trade costs, some firms are single-plant firms in the large or in the small
country; (v) for smaller trade costs, all firms are single-plant firms in the
large country.
As in Raybaudi-Massilia (2000), Ekholm and Forslid (2001), and Behrens
and Picard (2007), our analysis confirms that the home market effect is at-
tenuated by multinationals. For large trade costs all varieties are produced
in both countries (all firms are multinationals) and the small country does
not suffer in terms of varieties produced locally. Moreover, we show that the
share of total production in one country is equal to its share in population.
The home market effect vanishes. For lower trade costs, some firms concen-
trate their production in a single-plant and the home market effect comes
into effect: the share of single-plant firms and the share of production in the
small country are always smaller than its share in population. A reduction
of trade costs increases this effect because it affects competition in the small
country more strongly than in the large country.
Concerning the levels of production (and employment) in each country,
we show that a reduction in trade costs induces all firms to produce more.
A reduction in trade costs also induces firms to change their organization
2Berhens and Picard (2007) use a model with quadratic preferences to examine firms lo-
cation and organization. The present paper uses standard CES-Cobb-Douglas preferences
and emphasizes how the production of each firm evolves. The present paper also con-
tains a section that endogenizes countries sizes, which drives the model towards economic
geography.
3 In our framework, the number of firms is exogenously determined by the amount of
capital, which is fixed. An alternative would be to let the number of firms change with the
level of trade costs. Unfortunately, this alternative assumption prevents equilibria with
the coexistence of single-plant firms and multinationals; moreover a change in trade costs
would provoke catastrophic changes in firms structure (see Brainard, 1987; Elberfeld, Götz
and Stähler, 2005). Our assumption limits the analysis because the number of varieties is
fixed, but it allows a deeper analysis because it allows smooth changes in firm’s structure
when trade costs change.
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and their location. In many equilibria, this change is detrimental to the
small country because firms tend to concentrate their production into the
large country. Therefore, total production and employment in the increasing
returns to scale sector increase in the large country but they are likely to
decrease in the small country.
Still, we show that when multinationals and single-plant firms in both
countries coexist (equilibrium (iii)), total production (and total employ-
ment) can increase in the small country as trade costs decrease. Indeed,
some multinationals concentrate their production in the small country, which
raises production in that country. Other multinationals concentrate their
production in the large country, which reduces production in the small coun-
try. However, the reduction in production is attenuated because with trade
costs, the new single-plant firms in the large country sell less in the small
country than they were used to sell when they were multinationals. As a
consequence, we show that total production may increase in the small coun-
try. Improving freeness of trade may increase production and employment
in a small country, even though the home market effect favors the large
market.
We also extend the model to account for migrations of agents and we
identify “weakly stable” equilibria in which all firms are multinationals. At
one of these equilibria, a small migration of agents defines a new partition
of the population across countries, which is also an equilibrium in which all
firms are multinationals. Finally we show that when all firms are multina-
tionals they benefit from higher profits than if they were single-plant firms.
This is a rent that can be taxed away by governments without inducing
any change in firms’ location and organization. This result is also empha-
sized in Behrens and Picard (2005) and it complements the literature on tax
competition in models of economic geography (see Baldwin and Krugman,
2004; Kind, Midelfart Knarvik and Schjelderup, 2000; Ludema and Wooton,
2000).
We present the model in the next section. Then we assume that firms
cannot split their production in two plants (no multinational), which allows
us to present in a simple way the intuition behind the home market effect.
Then we solve the complete model with multinationals and we consider some
extensions.
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2 The model
The model builds on Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) with two countries, r and s.
The population of country r (resp. s) is denoted Lr (resp. Ls). Without loss
of generality, it is assumed that country r is larger than country s, Lr ≥ Ls
with Lr + Ls = L. These values are exogenously given in the first part of
the paper whereas they are endogenized in Section 4.3.
Technology There are two sectors. The traditional sector transforms
labor into an homogenous good under constant returns to scale. The mar-
ginal product of labor is normalized to one so that individuals who work in
that sector earn a unit wage. There are no costs to trade this good across
countries and the good is used as the numeraire.
The modern sector produces differentiated varieties under increasing re-
turns to scale. A firm active in that sector first creates its own variety, then
chooses the number of plants in which the variety will be produced and fi-
nally transforms one unit of labor into one unit of the variety. We assume
that individuals can work in both sectors. Thus the existence of both sectors
in a country ensures that workers earn the same (unit) wage. To build a
plant, a firm spends a fixed cost f which is paid in terms of the numeraire
good. A multinational firm duplicates its production in two plants whereas
a single-plant firm chooses the country in which it will operate its produc-
tion. To create its own variety, a firm must use one unit of a special input
which we call capital. The total fixed costs are thus equal to the costs of one
unit of capital to which we add f times the number of plants of the firm.
There are N units of capital available worldwide so that the number
of varieties is equal to N .4 The capital is mobile across countries and its
ownership is equally distributed among the population with each individual
owning N/L units of capital. This is the footloose capital model introduced
by Martin and Rogers (1995). Profits are exhausted by capital costs because
firms compete for the available units of capital. We denote Π the worldwide
capital revenues that are shared among the individuals.
There are no costs to trade the traditional good between both countries.
The modern good is costly to trade with a proportion φ ∈ (0, 1) of the output
shipped from one country arriving in the other country (the standard iceberg
trade cost hypothesis). This is the usual setup in economic geography (see
e.g. Baldwin et al., 2003).
4See Picard, Thisse and Toulemonde (2004) for a general discussion on the role played
by the location of capital owners on firms’ location.
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Preferences An individual who consumes CT units of the traditional
goods and C (i) units of variety i (i ∈ [0, N ]) gets the following utility
U = CμMC
1−μ
T , where CM ≡
µZ N
0
C(i)1−1/σdi
¶1/(1−1/σ)
, 0 < μ < 1 < σ
Thus, she spends a share μ of her income on the modern goods and a share
1− μ on the traditional good. The modern good is a composite made of a
continuum of differentiated varieties i with a constant elasticity of substitu-
tion between varieties, σ.
The income available in country r is denoted Yr.5 Accordingly, the de-
mand for variety i in country r is iso-elastic:
Cr(i) = μYr (Pr)σ−1
£
p0r(i)
¤−σ where Pr ≡ ∙Z N
0
p0r(i)
−(σ−1)di
¸−1/(σ−1)
(1)
The income available in country r is equal to the labor income plus the
country’s share of capital revenues, Yr = Lr + Π ∗ Lr/L. The price index
of the varieties sold in that country is Pr and p0r(i) is the consumer price of
variety i in country r,i.e., the price paid by a household located in country r
for one unit of variety i. This price is equal to the mill price, pr(i), if variety
i is produced in country r but it is larger than the mill price if variety i
is produced in the other country s: p0r(i) = ps(i)/φ where ps (i) is the mill
price of a variety i produced in country s. For notational convenience we
define Φ ≡ φσ−1, which Baldwin et al. (2003) call freeness of trade.
Price setting There are Nr firms producing only in country r, Ns
firms producing only in country s and Nt multinational firms that have a
plant in both countries, with Nr + Ns + Nt = N .6On each market, the
firm sets its price as a constant markup over its marginal costs because the
demand is iso-elastic and because each firm considers the price indexes as
given under the assumption of a continuum of firms. The marginal cost of
production is equal to one for any type of firms. Therefore, the mill price is
equal to p ≡ σ/ (σ − 1) for all varieties and the price index in country r can
be written as
Pr = p (Nr +Nt +ΦNs)
−1
σ−1 (2)
5 In the following, it suffices to replace the subscript r with a subscript s for the analysis
of country s.
6 t stands for two plants or transnational.
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In the following, we first examine the firms’ behavior when multinationals
are forbidden. This allows us to isolate the home market effect precisely.
Then we analyze the behavior of firms when they can split their production
between the two countries.
3 Firms location with single-plant firms only
Consider a single-plant firm i that is located in country r. The firm sets
a price p = σ/ (σ − 1) and earns a profit, gross of capital costs, πr(i) =
qr(i)/ (σ − 1) − f where qr(i) is its production. The production is sold to
the consumers from r whose demand is Cr (i), and to the consumers from s
who buy Cs (i) /φ units to consume Cs (i) units. We use (1) to write qr(i)
= μp−σ
¡
YrP σ−1r +ΦYsP σ−1s
¢
. At an interior equilibrium (with some firms
in each country), firms must earn the same profits in both countries. This
condition requires
πr(i) = πs(i) ⇐⇒ qr (i) = qs (i) ⇐⇒
Yr
Ys
µ
Pr
Ps
¶σ−1
= 1
We use (2) with Nt = 0, Ns = N − Nr, and the definition of nominal
earnings, Yr = Lr+Π∗Lr/L, which implies Yr/Ys = Lr/Ls, to re-write this
condition as
Nr
N
=
Lr
L
+
Φ
1− Φ
Lr − Ls
L
(3)
For such a proportion of firms in country r, profits are equalized across
countries. This is the interior location equilibrium. The equilibrium is
feasible only if the proportion of firms is smaller than 1, that is, only if
Φ ≤ Ls/Lr. For Φ > Ls/Lr, the output of a firm located in r is larger than
its potential output in the small country s; in such a case, the profit is larger
in country r and all firms locate in the large country, Nr/N = 1.
From (3), it is clear that the large country hosts a more than propor-
tionate share of firms. This is the home market effect. Moreover, the easier
it is to trade, the larger is this effect: the proportion of firms in the large
market increases with Φ.
To understand this result, note that the difference between the two coun-
tries is twofold: a difference in sizes (Yr/Ys = Lr/Ls for any location of firms
and for any trade costs) and a difference in competition if the mass of firms
differs across countries. Consider prohibitive trade costs (Φ = 0). In coun-
try k (k ∈ {r, s}), each firm sells μYk/Nk. The numerator μYk denotes the
market size of country k. The denominator denotes the market share of each
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firm active on market k (the strength of competition on market k). These
firms do not compete with the firms located on the other market because
trade costs are prohibitive. Obviously, the output per firm is equalized across
countries if and only if the partition of firms between countries is equal to
the partition of earnings (or populations). In that case, firms located in
the small country face a weak competition in a small market whereas firms
located in the large country face a fierce competition in a large market.
Now, consider a decrease in trade costs (an increase in Φ). This does not
change the market sizes but this affects the competition on each market. In
the small market, competition increases significantly because firms located
on this market now face the competition of the large number of firms located
on the large market. By contrast, competition increases less in the large
market because there are only few firms in the small market that can now
sell in the large market. As a result, everything else equal, output per firm
falls more in the small market than in the large market and the large market
becomes more profitable than the smaller market. The opening of trade
between a small and a large country increases substantially competition in
the small market and affects the large market to a lesser extent. Therefore,
some firms from the small market move to the large market, which decreases
competition in the small market and increases it in the large market. Hence,
the equalization of profits across countries is restored through a movement
of firms from the small to the large market which now hosts a more than
proportionate mass of firms.
4 Firms location with any types of firms
We now extend the analysis and allow firms to become multinational (or to
stay single-plant firms). We begin with the analysis of firms location. Then
we examine the effects of a reduction in trade costs on total production and
employment. Finally we discuss two extensions of the model to take into
account economic geography and tax competition.
4.1 Firms location
The analysis requires the comparison of the profits made by the different
firms. A single-plant firm in country r earns πr (i) = qr (i) / (σ − 1) − f
where qr(i) = μp−σ
¡
YrP σ−1r +ΦYsP σ−1s
¢
. A multinational firm sells more
because it saves on trade costs, but it also has to build two plants; its
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profits is πt = qt (i) / (σ − 1)− 2f where qt(i) = μp−σ
¡
YrP σ−1r + YsP σ−1s
¢
.7
It is the trade-off between the size of sales (proximity) and the costs of
duplicating plants that determines firms’ organization and location. To
check the optimal firms’ location and firms’ organization, we use (2) to
compare the profits for any partition (Nr, Ns, Nt).
πk =
1
σ
µ
Yk
Nk +Nt +ΦNl
+Φ
Yl
Nl +Nt +ΦNk
¶
− f , k, l ∈ {r, s} , k 6= l,
πt =
1
σ
µ
Yr
Nr +Nt +ΦNs
+
Ys
Ns +Nt +ΦNr
¶
− 2f . (4)
Also, we use (4) to find Π = Nrπr + Nsπs + Ntπt = μ (Yr + Ys) /σ −
(N +Nt) f , which we combine with the definition Yk = Lk + Π ∗ Lk/L
to find
Yk = σLk
L− (N +Nt) f
(σ − μ)L (5)
Plugging this expression in (4) gives the profits as functions of the partition
of firms (Nr, Ns, Nt).
We will distinguish two cases in the analysis. One in which the two
countries do not differ too much in size, and the other in which they sub-
stantially differ in size. The critical condition for separating the two cases
is the following:
Lr − Ls
L
<
σ − μ
μ
Nf
L−Nf (6)
The comparison of profits is done in Appendices 7.1 and 7.2. The critical
values of freeness to trade (Φ1, ..., Φ4) are given in Appendix 7.1. The results
show that under (6), five types of equilibria may exist:
• (i) for large trade costs (Φ ≤ Φ1), all firms are multinationals;
• (ii) for smaller trade costs (Φ ∈ ]Φ1,Φ2]), some firms are multination-
als and the others are single-plant firms in the large country;
• (iii) for smaller trade costs (Φ ∈ ]Φ2,Φ3]), some firms are multination-
als and the others are single-plant firms in the large or in the small
country;
• (iv) for smaller trade costs (Φ ∈ ]Φ3,Φ4]), some firms are single-plant
firms in the large or in the small country;
7This is the same output as a single-plant firm that could operate under no trade costs
(Φ = 1).
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• (v) for smaller trade costs (Φ > Φ4), all firms are single-plant firms in
the large country.
If (6) does not hold, then equilibria (iii) and (iv) vanish whereas (ii) holds
for Φ ∈ ]Φ1,Φ02] and (v) holds for Φ > Φ02. Figure 1a summarizes the results
when (6) holds whereas Figure 1b represents firms’ location otherwise.
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1φ1 φ2 φ3 φ4
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Figure 1a: firms’ location as a function of trade openness (σ = 5, μ = .7,
N = 1, f = .2, Ls = 2, Lr = 2.1) Plain: multinationals; dash: national
firms in r; dots: national firms in s.
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0.8
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0.2 0.4 0.8 1φ1 φ'2
(i) (ii) (v)
Figure 1b: firms’ location as a function of trade openness (σ = 5, μ = .7,
N = 1, f = .2, Ls = 2, Lr = 4) Plain: multinationals; dash: national firms
in r; no national firms in s.
We first examine the link between trade openness and firms’ organization
and location. Then we focus on the number of varieties produced in each
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country. Finally, we examine the link between population imbalances, trade
openness and firms’ organization and location.
As expected (and formally shown in Appendix 7.2), the number of multi-
nationals decreases with trade openness, whereas the number of single-plant
firms in the large country increases with openness. Interestingly, we distin-
guish two cases for the evolution of the number of single-plant firms in the
small country. For small differences between the two countries, the number
of single-plant firms in the small country increases with trade openness when
openness is low whereas it decreases with trade openness when openness is
large. When the difference between both countries is strong enough, the
small country never hosts single-plant firms.
The location equilibrium results from a trade-off between two forces. On
the one hand, firms tend to switch from multinationals to single-plant firms
when trade costs are reduced because it becomes less costly to export the
production. On the other hand, a reduction in trade costs exacerbates the
home market effect: as we have seen in previous section, single plant firms
tend to agglomerate in the large market because the small market suffers
more from the extra competition induced by the fall in trade costs. This
second effect is stronger, the larger is the difference between the sizes of the
two countries8 and the smaller are trade costs. If the second effect is not
too strong (i.e. the two countries do not differ too much in sizes), then a
reduction in trade costs first induces some multinationals to become single-
plant firms, some of them locate in the small country. However, a further
reduction in trade costs makes competition so strong in the small country
that all single-plant firms move to the large country. If the two countries
differ substantially in sizes, then multinational firms always locate in the
large country when they switch to single-plant firms.
Let us now focus on the number of varieties produced in each country.
For large trade costs, all firms are multinationals. Hence, both countries
produce the same number of varieties. For lower trade costs, the number of
multinationals decreases; the number of single-plant firms in the small coun-
try may increase, but one can check that it increases by a smaller amount.9
Thus, trade openness reduces the number of varieties produced in the small
country. Moreover, when single-plant firms exist, they are over-represented
in the large country: Nr/Ns > Lr/Ls, which is reminiscent of the home
8When countries have approximately the same size, they face more or less the same
competition.
9The only regime under which Ns+Nt could in principle increase is regime (iii) and it
is readily checked with the values of Ns and Nt in the Appendix that Ns +Nt decreases
with Φ.
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market effect (see the Appendix 7.3 for a formal proof).
 iv 
Φ 1 
L/2 
L 
(i) multinationals only 
(ii) multinationals and national 
firms in large country
Φ2 
Φ'2 
Φ1 
Lr 
Φ4 Φ3 
(5) 
(iv) national firms in both countries 
(v) national firms in large country 
(iii) all types of firms 
ii
i
iii 
 v 
Figure 2: firms behavior as a function of freeness of trade and population
imbalances.
We have represented the location equilibria as function of freeness of
trade. We can also represent them as a function of the population imbalance,
though the analysis is a little bit more tedious to perform. For that purpose,
we use the dependence of the bounds Φj on Lr: Φ1, Φ02 and Φ4 decrease with
Lr, whereas Φ2 increases with Lr and Φ3 is independent of Lr. Moreover,
Φ2 is equal to Φ1 at Lr = L/2 and it is equal to Φ02 when (6) holds with
equality. These properties allow us to depict the location equilibria in the
axes (Lr, Φ) as in Figure 2.10 The figure shows that for large trade costs,
firms are multinationals only if the population imbalance is not too large
(the grey area). If the population imbalance is intermediate, then some
firms are multinationals whereas the others are single-plant firms in the
large country (the area with vertical lines). Finally, if population imbalance
is large, all firms are single-plant firms in the large country (the area with
dots). For a small range of intermediate trade costs, we have a similar
10Note that the Figure extends the result to consider also Lr < L/2.
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ranking with the exception that if population imbalance is small, the three
types of firms coexist (instead of being all multinationals) (the black area).
Finally, small trade costs are incompatible with multinationals; we find the
same equilibria as in standard models of economic geography: coexistence
of single-plant firms in both countries for small population imbalances (the
white area) and single-plant firms in the large country otherwise (the area
with dots).
4.2 Production and employment
In this section, we focus on the production in each country. We first start
with the production per inhabitant, which allows us to emphasize the home
market effect; we then follow with the production per firm and we finish
with the total production.
4.2.1 Production per inhabitant
A plant located in country r sells μp−σYrP σ−1r to its domestic market. This
is the sole production of the plant if it is a subsidiary of a multinational. By
contrast, a single-plant firm also sells Φμp−σYsP σ−1s to the foreign market.
The total production in country r is μp−σ[(Nr +Nt)YrP σ−1r +NrΦYsP σ−1s ].
Dividing this expression by Lr gives production per inhabitant in country r.
We can use (2) and (5) to check that production per inhabitant is larger in
the large country r if and only if
N (LsNr − LrNs) +NrNs (1− Φ) (Lr − Ls) ≥ 0
This condition always holds.11 Thus, production per inhabitant is always
at least as large in the large country as in the small country. This is the
home market effect. Note however that if all firms are multinationals (Nr =
Ns = 0), the condition holds with equality. That is, the home market effect
vanishes and the production per inhabitant is the same in each country.
4.2.2 Production per firm
We examine how the output per firm responds to a reduction in trade costs.
A reduction in trade costs has several effects: (1) it makes the foreign country
more accessible, which induces single-plant firms to produce more for the
export; (2) it increases competition from foreign firms, which reduces the
11Using the result that LsNr − LrNs ≥ 0 under all regimes (see Appendix 7.3).
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market share (and the production) of each plant on its domestic market; (3)
it induces some firms to change their organization, and/or their location.
The balance between these three effects depends on the regime in which
firms operate.
Table 1 presents the main results that are developed in this section.
A fall in trade costs raises the production of each plant. This increase is
balanced by the loss of firms in the small country whereas it is (in most cases)
accompanied by an increase in the mass of firms in the large country. As a
result, production may increase or decrease in the small country whereas it
increases in the large country.
Δ production  
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) 
- production of a 
single-plant 
n.a. n.a. + 0 n.a. 
- production of a 
multinational 
0 + + n.a. n.a. 
 
small 
country 
- total production 0 ± ± - n.a. 
- production of a 
single-plant 
n.a. + + 0 0 
- production of a 
multinational 
0 + + n.a. n.a. 
 
large 
country 
- total production 0 + + + 0 
  0 : unchanged   + : increase   - : decrease   n.a.: non applicable 
Table 1: effects of a decrease in trade costs on production.
In the following we examine successively the production of multinationals
and single-plant firms under the various regimes.
Production of a multinational plant The production of a multina-
tional plant in country k is μp−σYkP σ−1k . Using (2) and (5), we can check
that this expression is proportional to
L− (N +Nt) f
Nk +Nt +ΦNl
(7)
which is a useful shortcut for production of a multinational plant in country
k. The numerator denotes the worldwide resources available for consump-
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tion; a proportion Lk/L of them are available in country k. The denomina-
tor represents the strength of competition within country k. For prohibitive
trade costs (Φ = 0), plants in country k compete only with plants located
in that country (i.e., with Nk + Nt plants). In the absence of trade costs
(Φ = 1), firms in country k compete with all the other firms (i.e., with
Nk + Nt + Nl plants). More generally, competition with foreign firms in-
creases when trade costs decrease.
Under regime (i), all firms are multinational. Then it is straightforward
to check that (7) is independent of Φ. The production of a multinational
plant in any country k is independent of trade costs because these plants do
not export.
Regime (ii) is more intricate: some single-plant firms are located in
the large country, all the other firms are multinationals, and a reduction in
trade costs induces some multinational firms to concentrate their production
in a single-plant firm located in the large country. We first consider the
production of a multinational plant located in the large country; then we
consider the small country.
In the large country r, one can write the production of a multinational
plant in r, (7), as [L− (N +Nt) f ] / [Nr +Nt]. The numerator denotes the
worldwide resources available for consumption. It increases when fewer firms
chose to be multinational because fewer resources are used in the duplication
of plants. Under regime (ii), the reduction in trade costs induces fewer
firms to be multinationals, so that resources available for consumption and
production are increased. The denominator is indicative of the strength of
competition among firms located in the large country. Under regime (ii),
all firms have plants located in the large country: Nr +Nt is constant and
equal to N .12 Hence, the market share of each firm is unchanged in the
large market. Combining all the effects, we check that a reduction in trade
costs increases the production of a multinational plant in the large country.
In the small country s, (7) can be written as [L− (N +Nt) f ] / [ΦNr +Nt].
As in the above analysis with the large country, firms can sell more if trade
costs fall because fewer resources are used in the duplication of multinational
plants; this can be seen from the numerator. The denominator, indicates
the strength of competition in the small country. In contrast to the case
of a large country, it is not constant because not all firms are active in the
small country: the single-plant firms are located in the large country only
12When trade costs decrease, the multinational firms that close their plant in the small
country to concentrate their production in the large country do not change the strength
of competition in the large country because they were already active in that country.
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and they suffer from trade costs when they sell in the small country. A fall
in trade costs has contrasting effects on competition. It makes the small
country more accessible to single-plant firms located in the large country.
The direct effect of this fall is thus an increase in competition. However, the
fall also induces some multinational firms to concentrate their production
into the large country. The plant that is closed in the small country had
a perfect access to the small market whereas the plant where production is
concentrated in the large country has a poor access to this market. Hence,
competition is decreased in the small market and plants of multinationals
gain market shares in the small market. These two effects on competi-
tion can be traced by differentiating the denominator with respect to Φ:
Nr + ∂Nt/∂Φ + Φ∂Nr/∂Φ = Nr + (1− Φ) ∂Nt/∂Φ. The first term is the
direct effect whereas the last is the indirect effect through a change in firms’
organization. The net effect on competition is unknown. Still, the combina-
tion of the ambiguous competition effect and the positive demand effect gives
non-ambiguous results. Using the values of Nr and Nt given in Appendix 7.2
and differentiating (7) with respect to Φ, gives (σ − μ)Lf/
h
μLs (1−Φ)2
i
which is clearly positive. In the small country, the plant of a multinational
produces more when trade costs fall.
The analysis of Regime (iii) is similar to the small country analysis
in regime (ii). The reduction in trade cost induces more firms to become
single-plant firms, which raises resources available for consumption because
fewer resources are spent in fixed costs. Multinational plants suffer now
more from competition of the single-plant firms located in the other country.
However, fewer firms are directly active in each country because some firms
have concentrated their production in the other country. As a result the net
effect on competition in each country is unknown. To find the net effect on
the production of a multinational plant, we use the values of Nr, Ns and Nt
given in Appendix 7.2 and we compute the derivative of (7) with respect to
Φ, which gives (σ − μ)Lf/ [μLl (1− Φ)] for country k 6= l. This is clearly
positive, which means that plants of multinational firms produce more.
Production of a single plant firm The production of a single-plant
firm in country k is μp−σYkP σ−1k + Φμp
−σYlP σ−1l . Using (2) and (5), we
can check that this expression is proportional to
L− (N +Nt) f
Nk +Nt +ΦNl
µ
1 +Φ
Ll
Lk
Nk +ΦNl +Nt
Nl +ΦNk +Nt
¶
(8)
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Under regime (ii) the sales of a single plant firm in its own country
are the same as the sales of a plant of a multinational in the same country.
We have analyzed above the effects of a fall in trade costs. On the one
hand, there are fewer multinationals, which allows to save fixed costs and
to consume more. On the other hand, competition is unchanged in the
home country as the multinationals that concentrate their production in the
foreign country were already active in that country. It results that single-
plant firms sell more to their own country. In the foreign country, the fall in
trade costs allows consumers to spend more on consumption, which increases
sales. Competition in that country is affected by two opposite effects. On
the one hand, the foreign country becomes more accessible, which raises
competition and decreases the market share of each firm. On the other
hand, there are fewer firms located in the foreign country, which reduces
competition. The net effect on competition is a priori unknown. Using the
value of Nr given in Appendix 7.2 and differentiating the sales on the foreign
market with respect to Φ gives Φ (σ − μ)Lf/ [μLr (1− Φ)] which is clearly
positive. Single plant-firms raise the sales to the foreign country. As a result
total sales of a single plant firms increase as trade costs are reduced.
We now examine the response of sales of a single-plant firm to a fall
in trade costs under regime (iii). On the one hand, sales to both coun-
tries increase because fewer resources are used in the duplication of plants.
On the other hand competition is affected by opposite forces: the foreign
country is more accessible but fewer firms have a plant located there; the
home country is also more accessible, which increases the competition from
single-plant firms located in the foreign country, but fewer plants are lo-
cated in the home country, which reduces competition. Despite these op-
posite forces, we can check that the net effect is positive. To check this
formally, it suffices to plug the values of Nr, Ns and Nt shown in Appendix
7.2 in (8) and to differentiate the expression with respect to Φ. This gives
(1 +Φ) (σ − μ)Lf/ [μLk (1− Φ)], for country k 6= l, which clearly increases
with Φ.
Under regime (iv), a reduction in trade costs makes both markets more
accessible. Single-plant firms sell more easily to the foreign market but they
suffer more from competition on their home market. Using in (8) the values
Nt = 0 and the values of Nr, Ns given in Appendix 7.2, one can show that
the production of a single plant firm is proportional to L (L− fN) /NLk,
for country k 6= l, which is clearly independent of Φ. Thus, trade openness
does not alter the production of single-plant firms in this regime.
Finally, under regime (v), single-plant firms from the large country gain
a better access to the small country when trade costs are reduced. However,
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they compete more severely to access these consumers. As a result of these
two forces they do not change their production as can be seen by plugging
Nr = N and Ns = Nt = 0 in (8): the resulting expression is independent
of Φ. Note however that consumers from the small country increase their
consumption because fewer goods are lost in transport. In this regime, trade
liberalization benefits the consumers rather than firms.
4.2.3 Total production
So far the analysis shows that firms (multinationals and single-plant firms)
never decrease their production when trade costs fall. This does not imply
that total production in a country never decrease, as the number of firms
responds to trade costs.
We first examine the response of total production (employment) in the
modern sector to trade liberalization in the large country. It does not re-
spond under regimes (i) and (v) in which neither the production per plant
nor the number of plants in the large country respond to a fall in trade
costs. Employment clearly rises under regime (iv): the large country hosts
more single-plant firms whose individual production is unchanged. It also
rises under regime (ii): the production of each plant increases when trade
costs decrease; some multinational firms concentrate their production into
the large country. Since single-plant firms produce more than the plant of
a multinational, total production is raised in the large country. It is less
straightforward to analyze regime (iii). The production of each plant in-
creases; as under regime (ii) but the multinational plants are not replaced
one for one by single-plant firms in the large country; some of them are
replaced by single-plant firms in the small country. Computations (shown
in Appendix 7.4) show that the net effect is nevertheless positive: total
production increases in the large country under regime (iii).
The response of total production (employment) in the modern sector to
trade liberalization in the small country is different. It does not respond
under regimes (i) and (v) in which neither the production per plant nor the
number of plants respond to a fall in trade costs. Employment clearly falls
under regime (iv): the small country hosts fewer single-plant firms whose
individual production is unchanged. Regimes (ii) and (iii) cannot be fully
treated analytically. Under regime (ii) the plants of multinational firms
produce more but fewer of them locate in the small country. The net effect
is ambiguous but simulations suggest that it is more likely to be negative.
The situation is less unfavorable in regime (iii). In that case, the small
country hosts more single-plant firms that produce more than the plants
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of multinational firms. The net effect of a fall in trade costs is ambiguous
but simulations suggest that it is likely to be positive, as shown in the next
figure.
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Figure 3: total production in the small country as a function of trade
openness. (σ = 5, μ = .7, N = 1, f = .2, Ls = 2, Lr = 2.1)
4.3 Economic geography
In models of economic geography, agglomeration of economic activity in
a country raises the attractiveness of that country and promotes further
agglomeration (see Baldwin et al. (2003)). This circular causality is absent
from the model that we have developed in which (partial) agglomeration is
caused by the home market effect only. Since we have assumed that agents
are immobile, the agglomeration of firms does not induce agents to migrate
to the country where firms agglomerate. In this section, we remove this
assumption and we assume that agents can move across countries.
In standard models of economic geography, it is assumed that some
agents can move but other agents cannot move: in Krugman (1991) work-
ers are mobile but farmers are immobile; in Forslid and Ottaviano (2003)
skilled workers are mobile but unskilled are not. The population that cannot
move creates a dispersion force that ensures that agglomeration of economic
activity is not the sole stable equilibrium. In our model, we have consid-
ered only one type of agent, the workers who are also the owners of capital.
Thus the model does not allow to distinguish the mobility of distinct agents.
Therefore, in this section, we have to assume that all agents are mobile. The
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dispersion force of a pool of immobile agents is removed. As a result, ag-
glomeration of firms and of agents will be a stable equilibrium for any value
of trade costs. Still we show that this is not the only stable equilibrium.
The existence of multinational firms creates other equilibria for large trade
costs.
When moving, an agent considers her earnings in both countries. By
construction, the wage is the same across countries and an agent earns the
same share of profits wherever she locates. Therefore, the nominal earnings
are equal across countries. By contrast, real earnings may differ because the
price levels can be different. The price of the good produced under constant
returns to scale is normalized to one in both countries, but the price level of
the goods produced under increasing returns to scale will be different if the
number of varieties produced in a country is not the same as in the other
country: Ps is larger than Pr if and only if Ns < Nr. Therefore, individuals
will move towards the country that hosts more single-plant firms.
A location is an equilibrium if the agents do not want to migrate to
the other country and if firms do not want to move or to change their
status (single-plant versus multinational). The equilibrium is unstable if the
migration of a small mass of agents induces other agents to migrate in the
same direction. It is stable if the migration of a small mass of agents induces
other agents (or the same agents) to migrate in the reverse direction. We will
see that the existence of multinationals creates another type of equilibrium
which we call “weakly stable” and which we define as a situation in which
the migration of a small mass of agents does not induce any other agents to
move.
As a first type of equilibrium, we consider agglomeration of agents in one
country (say country r, Lr = L and Ls = 0). Then, it is readily checked that
all firms choose to be single-plant firms in country r (Φ4 = 0 and Φ02 → 0):
Nr = N > Ns = 0. Therefore, the price level is smaller in country r than
in s and the agents do not want to migrate to country s. Agglomeration of
agents and firms is a stable equilibrium for any value of freeness of trade, Φ.
As a second type of equilibrium, we consider a case in which the mass of
single-plant firms is strictly positive. This partition of firms is an equilibrium
only if the price levels are equalized across countries, that is, only if the
mass of single-plant firms is the same in both countries. However such an
equilibrium is unstable because the migration of a small mass of agents to
country r, induces more firms to become single-plant firms in r and it induces
fewer firms to stay single-plant firms in s (it is readily checked that under
equilibria of types (iii) and (iv), Nr increases with Lr, see the expressions
of Nr in Appendix 7.2). Thus, the price level decreases in country r, which
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induces more agents to migrate to that country.
Finally, we consider a case where all firms are multinationals. The price
levels are then equal in both countries, and this partition of firms is compat-
ible with an equilibrium because none of the agents want to move. As can
be seen from Figure 2, for a given value of freeness of trade, there is a range
of the partition of agents that supports an equilibrium with multinationals
(the grey area). Within this range, the migration of a small mass of agents
does not induce firms to change their status. Since firms remain multina-
tionals, the price levels are still equalized across countries and agents do not
want to follow or to counter the initial migration. This type of equilibrium
is weakly stable.
To sum up, the stable equilibria of the model with workers mobility are
depicted by full agglomeration of firms and workers (the top and bottom
borders of Figure 2)13 and the weakly stable equilibria are depicted by the
grey area in which all firms are multinationals. The model includes strong
agglomeration forces, so that agglomeration of economic activity is always
stable. Still, the possibility for firms to split their production across coun-
tries attenuates the agglomeration force. For large trade costs and for a
partition of agents that is not too unequal, there exists weakly stable equi-
libria in which firms locate plants in each country. In this simple model,
these equilibria are clearly not pareto-efficient. The reason is that there is
no costs associated to agglomeration: no congestion costs and no costs of mi-
grations. The number of varieties produced under agglomeration is the same
as under a weakly stable equilibrium, so that agents benefit from the same
price level in both types of equilibria. However agglomeration requires fewer
resources to be spent in the operation of plants, so that agents have a larger
consumption under agglomeration than when all firms are multinationals.
4.4 Tax competition
In models of economic geography, it has been emphasized that the country
where firms agglomerate (the core) can keep all firms even if it imposes a
larger tax rate than the periphery (see Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; Kind,
Midelfart Knarvik and Schjelderup, 2000; Ludema and Wooton, 2000). The
13Note that if we assume that only some agents are mobile, then the equilibrium with
agglomeration would be replaced with an equilibrium in which all mobile agents are ag-
glomerated in a single country whereas firms are not necessarily agglomerated. In terms
of Figure 2, the firms behavior would be represented by an horizontal line at the value
of Lr equal to the sum of the mass of immobile workers from r and the mass of mobile
workers.
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intuition is simple: firms agglomerate in the core because they make profits
that are strictly higher than in the periphery. A small increase of the tax on
their profits will not reverse the inequality even if the tax in the periphery
is unchanged. The government just taxes the locational rent. Thus it is
possible to tax firms in the core more than in the periphery. This result
holds for values of parameters that allow for agglomeration, i.e. for small
trade costs.
In this paper, it is straightforward to check that a rent is also created at
large trade costs because of the existence of multinational firms (see Behrens
and Picard, 2005, for a similar result). Indeed, for large trade costs and for
countries that do not differ too much in sizes, all firms have plants in both
countries because their profit is strictly larger than under concentration of
their production in a single plant. This profit differential is an organizational
rent that can be taxed by a government. Indeed, a country can capture parts
of the profits made by a plant located on its territory without inducing the
multinational to close this plant and to concentrate its production in the
other country.
5 Conclusion
The paper develops a model with two asymmetric countries. Firms choose
the number and the location of plants that they operate. We show how firms
location, firms organization and firms production depend on trade costs and
on the population imbalance.
All firms (multinational firms and single-plant firms) raise (do not de-
crease) their production when trade costs fall. However, a fall in trade costs
also induces some firms to change their location or organization. Fewer
firms choose to organize themselves as multinationals; more firms choose to
have a single-plant located in the large country. There is also a range of
trade costs for which some firms choose to concentrate their production in
a single-plant located in the small country. As a result, total production
(employment) never decrease with trade costs in the large country, whereas
it may increase or decrease in the small country. A fall in trade costs is
unambiguously beneficial to the large country that benefits from the home
market effect. It may, or may not, benefit the small country.
The effect of the population imbalance on the location and organization
of firms depends on the level of trade costs. We distinguish three cases.
First, for large trade costs, a small population imbalance induces firms to
choose a multinational organization. A larger imbalance induces some of
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the firms to concentrate their production into the large country whereas
the other firms are multinationals. Finally, a huge imbalance induces all
firms to be single-plant firms into the large country. Second, for lower trade
costs, a small imbalance induces some firms to be multinationals whereas
the other firms are single-plant firms in the large or in the small country. A
larger imbalance favors the large country in which more single-plant firms
locate. Third, for small trade costs, all firms are single-plant firms whatever
the population imbalance. Some single-plant firms are active in the small
country if the imbalance is small whereas they are all active in the large
country if the imbalance is large.
We extend the model in two directions. First we endogenize country
sizes: individuals migrate towards the country where real earnings are larger.
The model does not have a strong dispersion force (such as an immobile mass
of agents) and it is therefore not surprising that agglomeration of agents and
firms is a stable equilibrium for any level of trade costs. Still there exists
another equilibrium for large trade costs: all firms are multinationals and
the population imbalance is not too strong. In that equilibrium a small
migration of agents does not induce firms to change their organization and
it does not entail any change in the real earnings of the agents. Therefore,
the migration is not followed by any force that induces some agents to follow
the initial migration or that induces the agents who have migrated to migrate
back. This is a “weakly stable” equilibria where a small deviation from the
initial equilibrium immediately ends up in a new equilibrium where all firms
remain multinationals.
Second, we show that the equilibrium in which all firms are multination-
als creates a rent. A government can tax this rent away without inducing
the firms to change their location.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Critical values of Φ
Φ1 ≡ 1−
Nf (σ − μ)
μ (L− Lr)
L
L− 2Nf
Φ02 ≡
∙
1 +
Nf (σ − μ)
μ (L− Lr)
L
L−Nf
¸−1
Φ2 ≡ 1−
Nf
μLr
σL− 2μLr
L− 2Nf
Φ3 ≡ 1−
2 (σ − μ)Nf
μ (L− 2Nf) +Nfσ
Φ4 ≡
Ls
Lr
7.2 Location equilibria with any type of firms
Equilibria of type (i). We set Nt = N , Nr = 0 and Ns = 0 in (4) and
(5). Then we check that πt > πr and πt > πs if and only if Φ < Φ1.14
Equilibria of type (ii). We set Ns = 0 in (4) and (5), which we plug in
πr, πs and πt. To have coexistence of multinationals and single-plant firms
in the large country, it must be that πt = πr, which requires
Nt
N
= 1− 1σL−μLr
h
(σ−μ)L
1−Φ −
μLs(L−2fN)
Nf
i
,
Nr
N
= 1− Nt
N
It is readily checked that Nr > 0 if and only if Φ > Φ1 and Nt > 0 if and only
if Φ < Φ02. Also, to have Ns = 0 it must be that, at the equilibrium, πr > πs
which requires Φ < Φ2. Finally, Φ02 > Φ2 if and only if (6) is fulfilled. Hence,
under (6), equilibria of type (ii) exists if and only if Φ ∈ (Φ1,Φ2). Note that
it is easily checked that Nr increases with Φ whereas Nt decreases with Φ.
Equilibria of type (iii). It must be that πt = πr = πs. These two
conditions requires that
Nr
N
=
Lr
L
+
Φ
1− Φ
Lr − Ls
L
− Ls
L
Nt
N
Ns
N
=
Ls
L
+
Φ
1−Φ
Ls − Lr
L
− Lr
L
Nt
N
Nt
N
= 1− 2 (σ − μ)
σ (1− Φ) +
μ (L− 2fN)
σNf
14Note that the second inequality is always fulfilled under the first inequality.
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It is readily checked that Ns > 0 if and only if Φ > Φ2 and that Nr > Ns.
Also, Nt > 0 if and only if Φ < Φ3. Hence, all types of firms coexist if
Φ2 < Φ < Φ3. Note that the interval exists (Φ3 > Φ2) if and only if (6) is
fulfilled.
Finally, it is readily checked that Nr and Ns increase with Φ whereas Nt
decreases with Φ.
Equilibria of type (iv). We set Nt = 0. To have single-plant firms in
both countries, it must be that πr = πs, which requires
Nr
N
=
Lr
L
+
Φ
1− Φ
Lr − Ls
L
,
Ns
N
= 1− Nr
N
Nr is always positive whereas Ns is positive if and only if Φ < Φ4. Finally,
the profit of a multinational must be smaller than that of a single-plant firm:
Φ > Φ3. Hence, single-plant firms coexist if Φ3 < Φ < Φ4 where it can be
checked that Φ4 > Φ3 if and only if (6) is fulfilled. Note that it is readily
checked that Nr increases with Φ whereas Ns decreases with Φ.
Equilibria of type (v). We set Nr = N , Ns = 0, and Nt = 0. We check
that πr > πs if and only if Φ > Φ4 whereas πr > πt if and only if Φ > Φ02.
Moreover, Φ4 > Φ02 if and only if (6) is fulfilled.
7.3 Proof that Nr/Ns > Lr/Ls
Under regimes (ii) and (v), the result is trivial (Ns = 0 and Nr > 0).
Under regime (iii), we can use the equilibrium values of Nr, Ns and Nt to
show that NrLs−NsLr = (Lr − Ls) [Nt (1− Φ) +NΦ] / (1− Φ) > 0. Under
regime (iv), Ns = N −Nr, and we can use the value of Nr to establish that
NrLs −NsLr = (Lr − Ls)NΦ/ (1− Φ) > 0.
7.4 Proof that the total production in the large country in-
creases under regime (iii)
Total production in the large country is μp−σ[(Nr +Nt)YrP σ−1r +NrΦYsP σ−1s ].
Using (2) and (5), we can check that this expression is proportional toµ
Nr +Nt +NrΦ
Ls
Lr
Nr +ΦNs +Nt
Ns +ΦNr +Nt
¶
L− (N +Nt) f
Nr +Nt +ΦNs
We use the values of Nr, Ns, Nt in regime (iii) from Appendix 7.2 to show
that this expression is equal to
(1− Φ)L+ 2NfΦ
(Φ− 1)2 Lr
σ − μ
σ
(Lr − ΦLs)
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The derivative of this expression with respect to Φ is
σ − μ
σLr (1−Φ)3
[(Lr − Ls)L (1− Φ) + 2Nf (Lr +ΦLr − 2ΦLs)] > 0
Under regime (iii), total production increases when trade costs fall.
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